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1 Introduction 
The American labor relations system does not adequately provide employee 
representation to the degree demanded by employee preferences. Moving to a non-
exclusive representation system would extend the right to organize and collectively 
bargain to many workers who cannot practically exercise their rights, but should be 
implemented incrementally by allowing minority unions where a majority representative 
is not already certified. This change to the interpretation of labor law would undoubtedly 
increase union membership and density, but may also reduce the conflictual nature of 
American labor relations and lead to labor force that is more productive for employers 
and more stable for employees.  
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 governs labor relations in the private, 
non-agricultural sector (excluding the railway and airline sectors covered under the 
Railway Labor Act of 1926). After the NLRAʼs passage, millions of workers joined unions 
to negotiate improved compensation and working conditions with their employers. In the 
years before and immediately after the NLRAʼs passage, workers commonly joined 
unions by signing up for membership and collectively bargaining a contract with their 
employer that was applicable to only the members of the union.  
The NLRA established an election system under Section 9(a) for determining 
which union would exclusively represent the entire group of workers if there were a 
conflict between multiple groups. Under this system, at least thirty percent of workers 
within a bargaining unit (a group of workers with similar community of interest) express 
support to hold a representation election, several weeks or months later an election is 
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held to determine if the bargaining unit is represented by a union and which union would 
be the exclusive representative. The “members only” unions that were commonplace 
during the early years of the modern American Labor movement faded away as unions 
turned toward an exclusive, election-based model for determining labor union 
representation and abandoned members only representation as a strategy. Though the 
NLRA still protected the rights of minority unions, their formation became less common 
in post-war industrial relations. With the emphasis on representation elections and 
majority unionism, employers gained an enormous advantage by campaigning against 
unions and defeating them in a certification election, effectively barring their employees 
from collective bargaining.  
With the vast majority of Americans employed in the private sector, policymakers 
should care about the health of the labor relations system as a means to mitigate 
disputes and ensure the socially fair distribution of economic gains. Unions are the 
primary institutions that democratically represent workers in the workplace and the 
economy at-large. Their weakness in recent years has been a substantial contributing 
factor in widening income inequality, decreasing aggregate demand, and stagnating 
wages (Buchele and Christiansen 1993; Glyn 2007). Ensuring the civil right to 
collectively bargain is essential to reversing these negative labor market trends. An 
effective labor relations system is the keystone of an inclusive and productive economy 
and reforming our current system should be a top priority for policy makers.  
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2 Methods 
In this paper, I will discuss the main criteria of a good system of industrial 
relations for which to measure the outcomes of several proposed reforms. I will discuss 
each alternative reformʼs performance by reviewing the relevant literature regarding 
problems in U.S. industrial relations. The literature will provide the background for both 
the criteria and the assessment of each modelʼs outcomes. I will also estimate the size 
of the unmet demand for union representation using recent survey data from the Pew 
Research Center to give context to the size of this policy problem. Finally, I will discuss 
the preferable reform with regards to the criteria and its political feasibility within the 
context of National Labor Relations Board rulemaking and the literature regarding the 
major stakeholders. 
3 What are the criteria for a well-functioning industrial relations system? 
 This section discusses six criteria of a good industrial relations system that will 
be used to assess the outcomes of proposed reforms. Each of these criteria addresses 
a particular reform of the dysfunctional industrial relations system. Political feasibility is 
addressed separately regarding the policy recommendation since the political prospects 
for labor law reform are very unlikely. 
3.1 Freedom of Association 
Under a good industrial relations system, workers who desire to collectively 
bargain with their employer(s) would be granted their right without unnecessary barriers. 
The right of workers to organize to protect their interests and collectively bargain 
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through their preferred representative is expressed in both the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Section 23) and in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Sec. 7). 
Implicit in this criterion is the promotion of workplace democracy. Workers should be 
free to exercise their right to elect representatives or to join the organization that best 
serves their preference for representation without coercion. This has been enumerated 
as a right in all developed countries so that employers must recognize the rights of 
workers as citizens and not merely an instrument of production. 
Under a fair industrial relations system, the “gap” between the desired level of 
representation and the actual level of representation should be minimal. In the 
classically liberal sense, workers should not be coerced to join or not join an 
organization or collectively bargain. However, given that employers have substantial 
power over employees and an interest in reducing employeesʼ bargaining power, it is 
much more likely that the desire for collective representation outpaces the actual 
representation amongst workers.  
3.2 Limits Free-Riding 
 Free riding allows non-participants to receive the benefits of collective action 
while not contributing to its outcome. Free riding is a persistent problem in industrial 
relations since workers who do not want union representation will receive the benefits of 
a better workplace, including higher wages, by being covered by the collective 
bargaining agreement or through the spillover effects of increased bargaining power of 
labor in general. The benefits to the individual employee to take action to join or form a 
union are not enough to outweigh the risks of retaliation from management if they will 
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get the benefits of othersʼ organizing efforts. By limiting the ability to free ride, workers 
must either actively support collective bargaining or refrain from benefiting from its 
gains. A good industrial relations system should limit the ability of non-participants to 
reap the gains of collective action and thereby encourage participation. 
3.3 Maintains a High Level of Aggregate Demand 
Enhanced bargaining power for labor would translate to higher aggregate 
demand. Lowering the unemployment rate and keeping wages more closely tied to labor 
productivity drive consumersʼ purchasing power, growing the entire economy rather than 
just allocating a larger share of firmsʼ expenditures to labor. Higher sales and profits 
would justify the higher wages and reinforce wage-led economic growth. 
While this may be in the interest of most Americans, it is not in the interest of the 
individual enterprise to redistribute profits to workers as wages without its competitors 
doing the same. Employers that exploit the weak bargaining position of their employees 
could still profit from the increased demand for their goods and services caused by the 
gain sharing within other firms. Ideally, unions should take wages out of competition and 
maintain a consistently rising standard of living. With ample bargaining strength, unions 
would prevent employers from “racing to the bottom” and competing with lower wages 
against one another. 
 Real wage growth has slowed while productivity has increased substantially in 
the last thirty years (see figure 1). This is due to a lack of bargaining power for labor 
and, at least in part, the decline of unionization (Glynn 2007; Pierson and Hacker 2010). 
Private sector union membership in the US is currently 6.9%, the lowest it has been 
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since the passing of the NLRA in 1935 (See Figure 2). In addition to representing 
workers in the workplace, a functioning industrial relations system would help to ensure 
that the share of wages in the economy is at an adequate level and the increased 
aggregate demand will boost the economic gains for employers and employees.   
3.4 Promotes Non-Conflictual Workplaces 
Workers naturally have less bargaining power vis-à-vis their employers in the 
standard employment relationship. Though the employment relationship may always 
have some adversarial element, a good industrial relations system should enable 
workers to channel the adversarial relationships into effective cooperation in the 
workplace. While some would say an ideal labor relations system should solely prevent 
disruptions in production, it should also facilitate and incentivize cooperative 
relationships between labor and management that are mutually beneficial to both 
parties. 
  Research even suggests that economic gains might not be captured by either 
labor or management due to adverse social relations within the firm (Ash and Seago 
2004; Freeman and Medoff 1984). Significant gains in productivity can be realized from 
workers making some of the production decisions within the firm. Buchele and 
Christiansen (1999) assert that earning a higher share of economic gains and strong 
workersʼ rights contribute to higher productivity of the economy overall. Instead of labor 
market regulation and organizations acting solely as a “cost” to firms, they can also 
provide benefits of productivity growth from a more cooperative and dedicated labor 
force.  
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3.5 Promotes Training and Human Capital Development 
 Training and professional development are costly for firms and there is no 
guarantee that the individual firm could benefit from training that it funds on its own. 
Additionally, workers without job security or the possibility of advancement and higher 
wages typically do not invest in their own training or job specific education, as they may 
not reap the benefits for higher productivity or continue in the same job. Better and more 
access to training solve a problem that firms face (shortage of skilled workers) and 
gives workers a career ladder and job security, creating a mutually beneficial 
relationship for both parties. Unions have long been criticized as being resistant to 
labor-saving innovations that threaten their job security. Training to adapt to such 
changes should reduce such concerns and provide firms with skilled workers adapted to 
their changing workplace (Buchele and Christiansen 1999). 
This positive externality could be more efficiently produced if workersʼ 
organizations coordinated training and professional development for their members. A 
good industrial relations system promotes the development of human capital by 
encouraging the development of workersʼ skills beyond their own ability to pay for 
training themselves. The improved social relations and communications within the firm 
explains, at least in part some of the productivity gains associated with unionization 
(Freeman and Medoff 1984; Ash and Seago 2004). 
3.6 Adaptability to the Changing Workforce 
 The current election-based exclusive representation system was built with large 
corporate employers that negotiate with workers with clear roles as employees in mind. 
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However, the modern workplace is very different than that of the 1930s. Today, there 
are few stable employers with large groups of homogeneous workers. It is increasingly 
difficult for the NLRB to define bargaining units based on “community of interest” as job 
descriptions and duties have become less standardized. To maintain effective 
representation and stability for workers, a good industrial relations system should allow 
labor unions to adapt to new workers and industries and eliminate non-standard 
employment arrangements (such as independent contractors) that serve only to deny an 
employee rights. 
4 Alternatives for U.S. Labor Law Reform 
 There have been several major reform proposals to improve the American labor 
relations system. The systems proposed have elements that are common in other 
advanced industrial economies. Here, I examine some common proposed reforms 
derived from popular systems around the world. Allowing a minority of employees to 
form a union and bargain with the employer, allowing workers to certify a union through 
the “card check” process, and transitioning to a corporatist bargaining regime are 
possible reforms to better meet the criteria for a good industrial relations system. The 
consequences of and opportunities for refraining from reform and letting present trends 
continue are also considered in this section.  
4.1 The Employee Free Choice Act model 
In 2007 and again in 2009, labor advocates lobbied Congress to pass a 
proposed set of reforms called the “Employee Free Choice Act”. The act raises 
penalties for employers that break the law during organizing campaigns, mandates 
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binding arbitration for stalled first contract negotiations, and, chiefly, allows workers to 
organize unions by signing a card or petition in lieu of a certification election. This 
process, known as “card check”, avoids the problem of management intimidation during 
union elections and lowers the barriers to unionization. If a union wins the majority 
support of a group of workers by a petition, the union will exclusively represent all of the 
workers. Instead of a radical reform, the Employee Free Choice model is a “fix” to the 
current law that gives employers broad latitude to intimidate or delay workers seeking a 
union and the power to ignore their representatives without agreeing on a contract.  
4.2 Non-Exclusive Unionism 
 Another proposed alternative is shifting the industrial relations system (majority-
rule, exclusive representation) to a non-exclusive model. In a non-exclusive industrial 
relations system, workers can organize and collectively bargain with their employer 
regardless of whether their union represents the majority of workers at a company. 
Union elections under such a system would be superfluous; workers would be able to 
sign up for whichever organization represented them best, and any subset of workers 
could form or join a union. Workers are only covered under the collective bargaining 
agreement if they are members.  
 Multiple unions could also represent workers in the same workplace should they 
decide that employees have differing priorities in bargaining or do not believe that they 
share the same community of interest. Not only would workers have the choice of 
whether to be represented by a union, but also which union would represent them best. 
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In New Zealand, where this model is used, unions typically bargain as coalitions with 
their employer. 
4.3 Sectoral Bargaining 
 Sectoral bargaining is very common in many European countries. The sectoral 
model would move the locus of bargaining in the American labor relations system from 
between the firm and a union of its employees to between associations of employers 
and unions representing all the workers in that industry in the whole country or region. 
Instead of organizing and representing workers as employees of single firms, unions 
would organize and represent workers of entire industries, regardless of their employer. 
Union membership would be optional under a sectoral bargaining system, even though 
the union would bargain for the entire industry and the same benefits would apply to 
everyone. However, in some sectoral bargaining systems, benefits such as pensions 
and insurance are available only to members of the union. 
Under a sectoral bargaining system, an election or a majority petition of workers 
in an entire industry of a region would certify a union for all the workers in a defined 
industry; the firms of that industry would form an association to bargain with the union, 
and the government would compel both sides to bargain. While individual employers 
could harass their employees to not join the union, there would be no material benefit 
for them to do so since they would still be subject to the contract in the event the union 
won certification for the sector. The National Labor Relations Board would shift from 
defining bargaining units in single enterprises to defining appropriate bargaining units in 
whole regions or industries. 
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4.4 Allow Current Trends to Continue 
 Still another option for policymakers is to allow the present trends in American 
labor relations to continue. Without major reforms there is no real impetus for labor 
organizing on a large scale; such organizing attempts would still be met with active 
employer resistance and weak legal protections of workersʼ rights. Employersʼ strategic 
advantage over their employees in union certification elections and bargaining would 
remain largely unchallenged. Union membership would continue at its pace of slow 
gradual decline and compensation will continue to stagnate or fall.  
Small progressive changes to labor law may occasionally occur from agency 
rulemaking or state-level policy. The National Labor Relations Board has taken some 
steps to update their processes within the framework of the NLRA and related laws. 
However, recently it is more common that states restrict labor rights, such as enacting 
“right-to-work” laws and restricting public employeesʼ rights. Continuing membership 
declines would provoke further attempts to weaken labor organizations in the states 
where unions are most politically vulnerable (Delaney 1998). 
5 Comparing the Alternative Models Against the Criteria of a Good Labor 
Relations System 
  
 To fully consider the effectiveness of each of the alternative models, each 
modelʼs outcomes must be assessed for their performance against the criteria of a good 
labor relations system. Here, each alternative is measured by each criterion of a good 
labor relations system.  
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5.1 Freedom of Association 
 The Employee Free Choice model is closest to the current system of labor 
relations and fixes some of the current systemʼs shortcomings. The extreme power 
differential between employers and employees naturally causes employer coercion 
during organizing elections (Bronfrenbrenner 1994). 55% of workers even report that the 
most significant factor in determining how they personally would vote in a union election 
is the attitude of management (Freeman and Rogers, 2006). The Employee Free Choice 
model would help close the representation gap by easing the barriers to unionization 
and allowing those desiring representation to seek it out more easily. However, the law 
would not change the basic structure of American unions other than lowering the legal 
barriers to union organizing. This model does better than the current system for 
guaranteeing the freedom of association, but the weaknesses of the status quo, such as 
the requirement of majority support or maintenance of membership across employers, 
are still unaddressed. 
Under the non-exclusive representation model, workers would be free to form or 
join the organization of their choice and their collectively bargained contract would only 
apply to the members of the union. Other groups of employees could chose to join a 
different union if they feel that it would better represent them. The non-exclusive model 
returns to the original spirit of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Simply put, 
workers that wish to self-organize and collectively bargain have the right to do so. This 
model is liberal in the classic sense—that anyone who would like to join a union could 
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do so without institutional restriction. Switching to a non-exclusive representation model 
would substantially reduce the gap between desired and actual union representation. 
The sectoral bargaining system provides a different form of “freedom of 
association” than the other models, but still provides more freedom than a system that 
obstructs association altogether. Union agreements would expand to cover entire 
industries, but union membership would be optional. Bargaining between unions and 
employers organizations within each sector would cover wages, terms, and conditions 
for all workers and firms within the industry, even those that did not take part in the 
bargaining process. On one hand, this is a severely negative proposal vis-à-vis the 
“freedom of association” criterion; however, with a secure position as the agent of 
representation, workers would not be required to join the union that represents them, 
similar to the sectoral bargaining systems in many European countries. 
The current American labor relations system performs poorly with regards to 
freedom of association. The current systemʼs problems with freedom of association are 
that many workers are denied bargaining rights entirely--low-level managers, 
agricultural workers, public service workers (in some states), and independent 
contractors have no right to collectively bargain. Additionally, the enterprise-based, 
union election system provides employers with the incentive and legal ability to wield 
their influence over their employees (Brofrenbrenner 1994). This has led to many 
workers desirous of union membership, as high as 37% by Freeman and Rogersʼ 2006 
data, yet only 11.9% actually attaining it (BLS, January 2012). 
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5.2 Limits Free-Riding 
The Employee Free Choice model would not limit the free riding by non-members 
that still exists in the current industrial relations system. All workers within a bargaining 
unit would be covered by the union contract regardless of membership status. In states 
with “right-to-work” laws, there would still be many free riders that receive the benefits of 
the union contract but refuse to become members, effectively forcing members to pay 
for their representation. With respect to free riding, the Employee Free Choice model 
performs no better than the current system. 
 Free riding would be greatly reduced if the benefits of the union contract no 
longer extended to non-member employees of the same firm under a non-exclusive 
representation system. If unions could switch to be a “non-exclusive” representative of 
workers in a firm, they would cease representing non-members. According to Delaney 
(1993), the majority of these “free riders” would sign up if the benefits of the union 
contract no longer applied to them by shifting to a non-exclusive system. Some of non-
economic benefits gained by the union, such as safer working conditions, are non-
excludable and would still benefit non-members.  
Sector bargaining often allows for many free riders since all workers and firms in 
a sector would be subject to the agreement and few would be union members or party 
to the negotiations (Locke, Kochan, Piore, 1997). Though sectoral bargaining creates a 
massive “free rider” problem, unions may find it an acceptable trade-off for a more 
expansive influence on their industry and firms may prefer to standardize wages and 
take them out of competition. Labor unions could also possibly mitigate free riding by 
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offering auxiliary membership benefits to attract members, like insurance or discount 
programs.  
 Currently, American labor law is based around the concept of exclusive 
representation. Some workers that do not desire representation (or prefer a different 
kind of representation) are represented by the organization anyway. A “union security” 
clause in a typical collective bargaining agreement requires all employees to either 
become members of the organization or pay a “service fee” for the cost of 
representation. This may be coercive in one sense, but also disallows the incentive for 
some workers to gain the benefits of unionization without being members of the union. 
In “right-to-work states”, however, union security clauses are illegal and therefore allow 
some workers to receive the benefits of the contract without paying dues, effectively 
forcing their coworkers to pay for their representation. Free riders in the current system 
also have the legal right to the same representational procedures as members and can 
sue the union if they believe it did not fulfill its duty of representation. The current 
industrial relations system performs poorly with respect to limiting free riding, since 
workers can be covered under union contracts but refuse to become members.  
5.3 Maintains a High Level of Aggregate Demand 
The Employee Free Choice model of labor law reform does enhance workersʼ 
bargaining power, allowing labor (in general) to capture a larger share of the gains of 
increased productivity. With fewer barriers to unionization, the union density of the 
private sector would undoubtedly rise, and, with it, collective bargaining agreements 
with better compensation. Godard (2003) asserts that if the United States had always 
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certified unions with “card check”, then the union density rate would be 12.2 percentage 
points higher that the current rate or slightly more than double the current density. This 
model would increase worker bargaining power in the short-run, but would perhaps 
deteriorate in the long run as the workplaces with majority support for unions became 
unionized. 
The non-exclusive model increases worker bargaining power substantially by 
raising union density and removing obstacles to unionization for the low wage 
contingent workforce. This model allows a more strategic approach to organizing since 
workers could first organize in essential departments of the firm and recruit the most 
active members instead of building majority support in a defined bargaining unit, which 
may include neither the most active or strategically positioned members. This flexibility 
would allow employees of the countryʼs biggest low-wage employers to organize rapidly 
and negotiate as one union instead of holding elections and bargaining in thousands of 
independent bargaining units with large numbers of casual or part-time employees. 
Unionization for low wage workers could substantially raise their living standards and 
thereby increase their demand for goods and services. 
 Collectively bargaining at a supra-enterprise level would give workers a more 
powerful bargaining position than bargaining at the individual firm level since individual 
firms would be more influenced by the labor market rather than setting the terms of the 
market (Locke, Kochan, Piore 1997; Calmfors and Driffill 1988). Bargaining for a larger 
share of the profits taken from their labor and squeezing the distribution of wages are 
common elements of more centralized bargaining regimes as well (Finkin 1993; Buchele 
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and Christiansen 1999). Sectoral bargaining performs the best under this criterion since 
it provides unions with the “market power” of negotiating for an entire industrial sector. 
Additionally, firms and unions could seek national consensus agreements to maintain 
high levels of employment and human capital formation through their bargaining 
(Buchele and Christiansen 1999; Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Cobble 1994). 
 Allowing present trends to continue would not assuage the decline of union 
membership or the weakening of laborʼs bargaining power. The trend of stagnating real 
wages and their separation from productivity growth will continue (See Figure 1). 
Without organizational support for workersʼ bargaining power, the economy will continue 
to be profit-led, leading to further downward pressure on workersʼ wages. Though the 
decline of union membership may not be entirely to blame for the separation of wages 
and productivity, the decline of laborʼs bargaining power in the past few decades is 
evident and there is no sign bargaining power will increase for workers without the kind 
of significant policy intervention that took from them in the first place (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010, Glyn 2007). In light of this, the present trend performs the worst for 
maintaining aggregate demand. 
5.4 Promotes Non-Conflictual Workplaces 
Though the Employee Free Choice model allows an easier path to organizing a 
union and compels companies to reach an agreement with a new union, it changes little 
else to encourage the cooperation between labor and management. The reform could 
even result in a more antagonistic and legalist approach to labor relations. Companies 
may even conduct constant campaigns against their employees to coerce them not to 
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sign authorization cards. Such adversarial, legalist policies discourage participation by 
workers themselves and leave much of the decision making in the hands of union and 
company lawyers (Schatzki 1975). The prospect of constant anti-union campaigns from 
employers makes this model less desirable under the ʻNon-Adversarial Workplaceʼ 
criterion. 
The non-exclusive model promotes labor-management cooperation well in 
comparison to the other models. Since workers could join the union of their choice and 
workers typically prefer a less conflictual workplace, the largest unions would most likely 
be the union that is best at faithful representation and workplace problem solving 
(Schatzki 1975; Finkin 1993; Summers 1998). Additionally, since most employers would 
be required to collectively bargain with a union representing at least some of their 
employees, bargaining regimes would develop to facilitate mutual gains across entire 
sectors or regions (Cobble 1994).  
 In the centralized bargaining between employers and unions, both parties 
typically acquire some of the responsibility for the performance of the labor market 
overall. Though collective bargaining is naturally an adversarial process, in sectoral 
systems both sides seek to leverage mutual gains of the relationship and direct the 
development of labor relations within an entire industry. Broad cooperation between 
labor and management provides mutual gains that translate into higher wages and more 
productive workforces and standardized wages for employers. Buchele and 
Christiansen (1999) referred to this as the gains of harmonious social relations of 
production.  
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Though cooperation between labor and management under the current system 
occurs at the firm level, the atomized, adversarial labor relations system does not 
provide an effective mechanism for building industry wide agreements or encouraging 
consensus. The current industrial relations system emphasizes the adversarial nature of 
collective bargaining and union organizing without providing conduits for broad 
cooperation (Freeman and Rogers 2006). Battles between employers and their workers 
are often fought in court. Taking workplace conflict off the shop floor and into court is a 
very legalist and expensive path to workplace problem solving and takes the decision 
making power away from the workers and managers who live with the decisions 
(Schatzki 1975).   
5.5 Promotion of Training and Human Capital Formation 
 Since the Employee Free Choice model would increase union density overall, the 
present system of union apprenticeship and training programs would expand beyond 
the traditionally craft union sectors where they exist today. However, these programs 
may only develop in similar industries where they exist now as traditional unions expand 
in their core industries. In sectors with firms that would still be difficult to build majority 
support, especially the low-wage service sector, broad labor-management sponsored 
would still face the same disincentives to develop as they do under the current system. 
Unfortunately, workers in such sectors would benefit the most from training programs. 
The Employee Free Choice model does better than the current system with regards to 
training and human capital development since current programs are likely to expand, 
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but they would still leave many workers with less-than-adequate opportunities for 
training. 
 Since individual workers could decide on joining a union in the non-exclusive 
system, it is likely that unions would develop professional development and training 
programs independently to attract members (Schatzki 1975; Freeman and Rogers 
2006).  Surveys have shown non-union workers typically want more control over training 
decisions than they have (Freeman and Rogers 2006), and by signing up for 
membership they could access union sponsored training programs. Labor unions in a 
non-exclusive system could provide the coordination to match the need for job training 
with career ladders within the firm, similar to craft and building trades unions today. This 
model performs very well with regards to training and human capital development since 
all employees, regardless of the majority support of their coworkers, could have access 
to training and unions would have incentives to provide training to attract members. 
 Sectoral bargaining centralizes the decision-making regarding training. In 
countries that adopted the sectoral bargaining model, unions and employersʼ 
associations bargain for terms and conditions that affect the whole industry. These 
sectoral negotiations usually involve support for training, such as Germanyʼs high quality 
apprenticeship programs (Summers 1998; Buchele and Christiansen 1999). 
Agreements regarding training enhance both worker productivity and compensation, 
leading to a more productive workforce for the firms and better wages and job security 
for employees. Since all employers and workers are covered by the agreement, there is 
no problem with a firm or union funding a positive externality from which they do not 
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receive the benefits. Though this model does very well under the “Training and 
Professional Development” criterion. However, human capital formation may still be 
lacking if unions and employers do not emphasize it in their sector wide agreements. 
In the current system, sectors with high union density and secure bargaining 
position of workers (usually skilled craftsmen), strong apprenticeship and training 
programs have developed. These training programs are not as common outside the 
construction sector and when they do develop they do so with substantial government 
support. Without assurance that training programs would continue to benefit the 
individual firms that pay for them or the program participants continuing membership in 
the union, these programs are undersupplied outside of a few sectors and regions. With 
respect to training and human capital formation, the current system provides little 
incentive for unions and firms to invest in training for workers, and leaves much of the 
responsibility for funding human capital formation to the individual worker. 
5.6 Adaptability to a Changing Workforce 
The “Employee Free Choice Act” model is an adaptation of a model meant for the 
post-war industrial era of American labor relations; it relies on stable workforces with 
well-defined roles in easily definable bargaining units. When taken into the context of an 
increasingly casualized workforce, the Employee Free Choice model does not look like 
a robust solution to adapting labor relations to the modern economy. Even if organizing 
unions were easier, companies could circumvent union agreements by employing 
contingent workers and independent contractors. With this in mind, the Employee Free 
Choice model is barely a marginal improvement over the current system. 
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 A non-exclusive system would not separate the individual member from their 
position within the firm, allowing labor organizations to better adapt to a changing 
economy. Regardless of the merger, sale, or restructuring of a firm, the workers would 
be represented as groups of individuals and not as a “bargaining unit” leaving union 
representation unaffected by changes in the employersʼ corporate structure (Schatzki 
1975). Contingent employees could also be included in unions for the purposes of 
representation. Instead of undermining worker organizations due to their contingent 
position, contingent workers would have the same rights as regular employees. 
 Sectoral bargaining allows for large groups of workers in industries with many 
small employers and low wages (such as the service sector) access to an efficient and 
feasible collective bargaining regime. The National Labor Relations Board could 
transition from defining bargaining units from within a firm to defining the sectors and 
regions in which unions seek recognition. By emphasizing the representation of workers 
in their industry and the economy, sectoral bargaining could provide at least part of the 
solution to two of the major problems of advanced, post-industrial economies, the 
separation of wages and productivity and the growth in income inequality (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010; Glyn 2007; Buchele and Christiansen 1999).  
 The present nature of the U.S.ʼs post-industrial economy makes organizing and 
collective bargaining unnecessarily difficult for many groups of workers. Firms can 
petition to exclude certain members of the bargaining unit, hire independent contractors, 
and restructure to avoid the influence of their own employeesʼ organizations, and they 
frequently do so to reduce the influence of the employee over the employer. Many 
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workers in low-wage, contingent, and high turnover jobs are virtually unrepresented by 
labor unions due to their weak bargaining position and a multitude of employers. 
Additionally, this already large sector is a growing share of the workforce1 (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2010). 
6 Selection: Non-Exclusive Representation 
 After analysis of the probable outcomes of the alternative models against the 
criteria, non-exclusive representation performs the best generally over the other 
alternative models. Ranking each model on a 1-4, worst performing to best performing 
scale produces this decision matrix, with the highest score being the best performing: 
 
Alternatives	  
Employee	  Free	  
Choice	  Model	  
Non-­‐Exclusive	  
Model	  
Sectoral	  
Bargaining	  
Model	  
Let	  Present	  
Trends	  Continue	  
Freedom	  of	  Association	   2	   4	   3	   1	  
Limits	  Free-­‐Riding	   3	   4	   1	   2	  
Maintains	  High	  Level	  of	  
Aggregate	  Demand	  
2	   3	   4	   1	  
Promotes	  Non-­‐
Conflictual	  Workplaces	  
1	   3	   4	   2	  
Promotes	  Training	  and	  
Human	  Capital	  
Formation	  
2	   4	   3	   1	  
Adaptability	  to	  the	  
Changing	  Workforce	  
2	   4	   3	   1	  
Total	  Rankings:	   12	   22	   18	   8	  
	  
 
From this matrix, the Employee Free Choice model performs slightly better than letting 
present trends continue, however sectoral bargaining and non-exclusive representation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.t03.htm	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are clearly the better reforms. Non-exclusivity performs better than sectoral bargaining 
primarily because it ʻlimits free ridingʼ. Though in a sectoral bargaining system, free 
riding may be less of a concern if it did not impede collective action. 
Returning to the “members-only” union model that existed in the early days of the 
American labor movement would improve the American labor relations system in three 
notable ways. First, workers could organize unions and bargain with fewer institutional 
barriers, resulting in higher union density and increased worker bargaining power. 
Second, only the union members would be subject to its contract, allowing groups of 
workers to self-organize to negotiate for their preference of benefits and excluding those 
who do not wish to collectively bargain. Third, this model would more easily adapt to the 
changing American workplace and encourage the adaptation of industry-wide 
bargaining structures that could raise benefits for all workers. Lastly, the polarized 
political climate makes substantial labor law reform unlikely in the near future; allowing 
“members-only” unions would have appealing characteristics for policymakers on the 
right and left, making its adoption the most feasible of labor law reforms.  
 The strengths of the non-exclusive model rest primarily on its maximization of the 
freedom of association. This aspect increases union membership and lowers the 
barriers to collective bargaining for workers in largely non-union industries and firms that 
are more difficult to organize. The non-exclusive model would also effectively make the 
distinction between “union firms” and “non-union firms” irrelevant as most firms would 
bargain with labor organizations and would incentivize employers to seek multi-
employer or sector wide agreements with some of the similarities of the sectoral 
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bargaining model (Cobble 1994). Such multi-employer agreements would be particularly 
important for low wage service sector workers who work for many small employers. 
Examples of this organizing model can already be seen in the Justice for Janitors 
campaign and the waitress unions from the 1930ʼs to the 1960ʼs (Cobble 1991). This 
model would also make organizing campaigns for part-time workers at large national 
firms more possible since online organizing and national agreements would eliminate 
the strategic problems of building majority support at thousands of individual worksites 
(Morris 2005). 
The major tradeoffs associated with minority unionism are the difficulty of 
bargaining for employers, the difficulty of maintaining solidarity during strike actions, and 
the likelihood of termination for union activists. The cost of bargaining could be 
substantial if dozens of different organizations represented only a few employees each; 
however, such a case is an extreme example. In countries that operate with multi-union 
bargaining, unions can bargain in coalitions and most labor contracts contain similar 
terms across unions (Schatzki 1975). The institution of exclusivity may seem to promote 
solidarity amongst employees, but in practice the same problems of collective action 
remain unchanged. Members of different unions could still strike together, but would not 
be under obligation to do so. It can also be safely assumed that the workers that do not 
honor the strikersʼ picket line probably would not do so under any labor relations system 
(Summers 1998). As for the termination of union activists, it is not clear that any 
industrial relations system independent of other substantial reforms would be an 
improvement over the  
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Without the institution of exclusive representation, labor organizations may also 
compete against each other unnecessarily to gain members, or employers may 
discriminate against union members for promotion and hiring. However, this has not 
been the case in New Zealand, which moved from a sectoral bargaining system to a 
non-exclusive enterprise bargaining system. Surveys of union leadership contend that 
competition between labor organizations has been minimal since adopting the non-
exclusive system (Harcourt and Lam 2011). 
It is recommended that the National Labor Relations Board recognize minority 
unions as legitimate entities with which employers have a duty to bargain in the absence 
of a majority union. Instead of removing exclusive representation entirely, minority 
unionism should be a parallel path for representation when the majority of a firmʼs 
employees do not favor unionization. If the majority chooses to act as the exclusive 
representative, that option could still be available as it is currently. Further reforms to the 
labor relations system should include a more effective legal framework for sector-wide 
or multiple employer collective bargaining agreements and enforceable neutrality of 
employers regarding union organizing.  
7 How many workers would join unions if majority status were no longer a 
barrier? 
 
Even the transition to a hybrid, minority union system would present an 
opportunity for millions of American workers to form unions. Though the majority of 
American workers may still choose not to unionize, the higher union density would still 
increase bargaining power amongst all workers. Though it is difficult to surmise the 
effect of changes to the American industrial relations system, a “back-of-the-envelope” 
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estimate of the number of new members that would join unions illustrates the 
importance of reforming the current industrial relations system and the gap between 
desired and actual representation. This is a very conservative estimate of the workers 
likely to join or form unions and is approximate to estimates by Harcourt and Lam (2010) 
and Freeman and Rogers (2006). 
The most recent opinion poll with a “Very Favorable” response option was from 
Pew in March of 20112. Of all non-union households, 14% said they held “Very 
Favorable” view of labor unions. Multiplied by the total “non-union” workforce of 
110,824,000 (BLS, March 2012)3 is a group of 15,515,360 unrepresented workers that 
would be likely to join a union. It should be noted that this question asked the 
respondentʼs opinion of labor unions, not whether they would become a member or if 
they were exempt as management employees or unemployed.  
This is a conservative estimate because it includes only the number of non-union 
workers who have a “Very favorable” opinion of labor unions and are most likely to join a 
union by signing up for membership and does not include workers with only a ʻfavorableʼ 
opinion of unions. This estimate of 15,515,360 workers who would potentially join 
unions is more (a nearly 100% increase) than Harcourt and Lamʼs (2010) estimate the 
numbers of union members in the United States to be 30 to 50 percent higher if the U.S. 
switched to a non-exclusive representation system or achieving a 16 to 18 percent 
union density. However, Harcourt and Lam believed their estimate to be conservative 
since they based it on the counterfactual estimate of New Zealand moving to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  http://www.people-­‐press.org/2011/03/03/section-­‐4-­‐opinions-­‐of-­‐labor-­‐unions/	  3	  ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.ceseeb1.txt	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exclusive representation system. My estimate is still less (25.8% union density) than 
Freeman and Rogers (2006) estimate of a 44% union density if all workers were able to 
freely unionize. Freeman and Rogers (2006) also used their own polling data for their 
estimate, but included respondents that were less enthusiastic regarding their support 
for unionization. Though these estimates vary greatly, all three illustrate the severe lack 
of employee representation and a potential opportunity for unions to organize millions of 
new members if this policy problem were addressed. 
8 Political Obstacles and Opportunities 
 The enforceable duty to recognize and bargain with minority unions may be one 
of the few politically feasible labor policy interventions given the polarized political 
climate. This reform has the benefit of being recognized unambiguously by law 
already—no legislation would be necessary to return to the recognition and bargaining 
with unions on a “members-only, non-majority union”. In fact, it is only by conventional 
wisdom and legal tradition that exclusive representation became the emphasized 
section of the Wagner Act and members-only representation disappeared. A court 
decision or rule made by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) could effectively 
return minority unions to their protected and legal status as bargaining agents without 
the need for legislative action from Congress (Morris 2005; Finkin 2001; Freeman and 
Rogers 2006; Schatzki 1975). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld the power of 
the NLRB “adopt rules restricting conduct that threatens to destroy the collective-
bargaining relationship or that may impair employeesʼ right to engage in concerted 
activity.”  (NLRB v. Curtin Matheson 1990). 
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 In 2006, a group of workers at a Dickʼs Sporting Goods warehouse created a 
“workersʼ council” to represent the interests of its members as employees of Dickʼs 
Sporting Goods. The council was affiliated with the United Steelworkers, drafted a 
constitution, and collected dues from its members. Though neither the workers council 
nor Dickʼs Sporting Goods claimed the council represented the majority of workers of 
the warehouse, the council filed charges for the companyʼs refusal to bargain with it on 
a members-only basis. An advice memo to the NLRB from its Associate General 
Counsel recommended that the board deny the councilʼs charge that the employer 
refused its duty to bargain (NLRB 20064).  
If it had ordered the employer to bargain with the minority union based on a plain 
reading of Sections 7 and 8(a)5, then minority unions official status could have been 
legally recognized by the board, most likely occurring with a rule regarding the legal 
standing of minority unions. Unfortunately, the NLRB did not recognize the workers 
council at Dickʼs Sporting Goods and found the employer had no duty to bargain with 
them in good faith. The workers did, however, maintain their rights to self-organize and 
their activity was protected under Section 7 of the NLRA. They could request to meet 
with management or hold meetings to discuss organizing, but management was free to 
lawfully ignore them. 
 In the 2006 Dickʼs Sporting Goods case, the NLRBʼs Associate General Counsel 
conceded that the intent of the law regarding minority unions was that they should be 
recognized and protected, but the protection ceased short of ordering the employer to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  NLRB	  Case	  Number	  -­‐	  6-CA-34821	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bargain with them(NLRB Advice Memo 2006). Using Morrisʼs The Blue Eagle at Work, 
NLRB counsel cited the Wagner Actʼs legislative history and rejected versions of 
Section 8(a)5 of the NLRA during the bills drafting. The committee rejected the phrasing 
that would make it illegal for an employer to: “…refuse to bargain collectively with 
employees through their chosen representative, chosen as provided in section 9(a)” 
Sec. 9(a) describes the process for recognition of a majority representative. The 
Counsel interpreted the spirit of the law to protect organizing activity and duty to 
collectively bargain as entirely separable. 
The lawʼs draft committee approved the language as follows: “to refuse to 
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions 
of section 9(a)” (NLRA Sec. 8(a)5). The final version of the act only included provisions 
that certified a majority representative precluded bargaining with a minority union, but 
did not bar minority representation entirely (Morris 2005). NLRB Counsel provided 
statements from the Senate drafting committee, House drafting committee, and the billʼs 
sponsor Senator Robert Wagner specifically in support of majority-rule exclusivity in 
labor relations. But however unsupportive of non-exclusivity the drafters may have 
been, they did not specifically bar minority union representation by law or in practice in 
the absence of a majority union. In light of the NLRAʼs language that grants the right to 
workers to self-organize (Section 7) and the lack of a provision specifically barring 
collective bargaining with a members-only, minority union, minority unions are legal 
entities but lack official recognition from the NLRB. 
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The path toward legal status for collective bargaining for minority unions could be 
through regulatory channels (the NLRB), through legislation, or through litigation. Given 
the great difficulty of passing any legislation through Congress, it is unrealistic to expect 
any significant favorable reform through this strategy. According to Morris (2005), the 
NLRA already recognizes the right of minority unions to collectively bargain, but 
conventional wisdom has held that majority support is a prerequisite for a bargaining 
relationship. Unions or workers rights advocates could bring a case to the NLRB or 
court for a decision on the duty to bargain with minority unions. The Dickʼs Sporting 
Goods case is an excellent example to build the case for minority unionism recognized 
by the NLRB. The NLRB is currently composed of members with a more expansive view 
of the protections of the NLRA, than its members during the Bush Administration making 
the regulatory reform approach much more appropriate and realistic (Morris 2005; Hiatt 
and Becker 2005). 
Though unions could potentially feel threatened by the prospect of constant 
internal organizing to maintain membership or rival unions raiding their membership, 
unions as institutions have generally been supportive of minority unionsʼ rights. The 
United Steelworkers and six allied unions (IBEW, UE, UAW, IAM, CNA and CWA) 
petitioned the NLRB to rule in favor of bargaining rights for minority unions in the Dickʼs 
Sporting Goods case. The number of potential new members that could organize 
indicated by surveys, including the estimate in this analysis, would represent a great 
opportunity for labor to regain relevance in the economy. Minority unionism may also be 
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the most effective route to organize large national firms were majority support would be 
unlikely in a traditional organizing drive. 
 Though the business community is always cold toward labor policy reforms that 
could potentially enhance the bargaining power of their employees or threaten their 
firmsʼ “management rights” (Lichtenstein 2002; Finkin 2001; Locke, Kochan, Piore 
1997), conservative policy makers sympathetic to management concerns would find 
difficulty attacking an NLRB ruling recognizing minority unions. Members-only unions 
cannot compel membership as a condition of employment--eliminating the concern that 
workers are “forced” to join unions. Nor could detractors claim that workers are 
unwillingly supporting political causes with their dues money, since all would have joined 
individually. The demand for a secret ballot election would be made superfluous, since 
the union would only represent its members. Moreover, non-exclusivity in labor 
representation should be an issue championed by conservatives, it represents a very 
classical notion of individual choice (Schatzki 1975). To pitch this reform a different 
way—minority unionism “deregulates” barriers to union representation.  
8 Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Research 
 A ruling from the National Labor Relations Board to recognize minority unions as 
official representatives of their members for the purposes of collective bargaining would 
close the representation gap greatly and help to reverse the decades-long decline in 
union density. This policy would contribute to giving workers a more effective voice in 
their workplace and in the economy. Furthermore, this rule may be the most progressive 
labor policy reform that could occur in the current political climate. 
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 Further reforms would still be needed to protect workersʼ free choice to organize 
unions and collectively bargain. Some less-than-ethical employers will attempt to 
discourage their employees from collective bargaining through termination and coercion 
under any system. Recognizing members-only, non-majority unions frames the debate 
as labor organizing as an individualʼs right, not only as a pursuit of individual interest to 
improve compensation. These reforms should be built around the framework that 
employees are denied the practicality of exercising their rights given our restrictive labor 
laws, and that creating institutional pathways for greater employee voice builds a 
stronger more just economy. 
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